In the case of Smith v. Jones, an individual was charged with aggravated sexual assault on a prostitute. Defence counsel retained a psychiatrist to assess the accused person for the purposes ofpreparing a defence and assisting in sentencing. The accused was informed that the consultation with the psychiatrist was covered by solicitor-client privilege. In the course of the assessment with the psychiatrist, the accused described his plan to kidnap, rape, and kill prostitutes. The psychiatrist informed the defence counsel that in his opinion the accused represented a threat to society-he was dangerous and would likely reoffend. The accused pleaded guilty. Upon learning that his opinion was not to be used in evidence at sentencing, the psychiatrist commenced an action for a declaration entitling him to disclose the information in the interests of public safety.
The majority decision of the Supreme Court held that, while solicitor-client privilege is a principle fundamental to the administration ofjustice, it is not absolute and is limited when public safety is at risk. Three factors must be considered and weighed in determining whether concern for public safety will warrant setting aside solicitor--elient privilege. These are 1) clear risk to an identifiable person or group, 2) risk of serious bodily harm or death, and 3) imminent danger. This mirrors the criteria deemed important when considering a duty to warn in other circumstances (2) . The court concluded that Smith v. Jones met these criteria.
The dissenting position agreed that in certain circumstances solicitor--elient privilege should yield to the interests of public safety. They added, however, that breach of privilege should be as narrow as possible to protect the right of an accused to consult counsel and his or her designate without fear of recrimination. Finally, they stated that it is important to foster a climate in which dangerous individuals are more likely to disclose their disorders, seek treatment, and pose less danger to the public. Ifconfidence is undermined, individuals will not disclose the danger they pose and will not be identified, and public safety will suffer.
The implications of this decision are manifold. The court indicated that solicitor--elient privilege is the highest privilege re~ognized, and if a public safety exception applies to this, it WIll apply to all types of privilege and confidentiality. Thus, the duty to warn must now be considered a standard in 440 Canada. This is in accordance with, for example, the Ontario College ofPhysicians and Surgeons' standard ofcare adopted by Council in June 1998 (3) . It is anticipated that other provincial bodies will follow suit. Failure to follow this new standard of care will make a physician liable for civil and licensing disapprobation (4) . However, it should be noted that, under present legislation, breaking confidentiality could still result in civil, licensing, and even crirninalliability. Further, we concur with the minority opinion that this fmding limits the ability ofpsychiatrists to assist the courts on mental health matters, as defence attorneys will now be reluctant to allow clients access to psychiatrists for fear that it may jeopardize their case. This may, for example, undermine the intent of mental health diversion programs. In fact, initiating a psychiatric assessment, given the potential liability that may result, may come to be viewed as bad practice.
Despite laudable attempts by the court to clarify the circumstances when one should report, the solution is formulaic and will not be easily applied in practice, since risk and imminence are by no means stable entities or simple to identify.It is uncertain whether one is entitled to warn or disclose or whether one has a positive duty. While the court suggested the analysis to be applied in determining whether to disclose, they declined to delineate the precise steps to be taken. Since imminence is a crucial factor, in most cases legal action would be impractical, and psychiatrists presumably willhave to rely on telephone warnings to victims or police and consider certifying the individual.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has clearly enunciated a duty to warn in this decision. This confirms a standardofcare that is consistent with the current trend in practice. However, several issues arise from the decision that require clarification, which will inspire debate and commentary.
